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The first category consists of a family of one-step key-derivation functions, which derive 171 keying material of a desired length from a shared secret generated during the execution of 172 a key-establishment scheme (and possibly other information as well). 173
The second category consists of an extraction-then-expansion key-derivation procedure, 174 which involves two steps: 175 1) Randomness extraction, to obtain a single cryptographic key-derivation key from a 176 shared secret generated during the execution of a key-establishment scheme, and 177
2) Key expansion, to derive keying material of the desired length from that key-178 derivation key and other information. Since NIST's [SP 800-108] specifies several 179 families of key-derivation functions that are approved for deriving additional 180 keying material from a given cryptographic key-derivation key, those functions are 181 employed in the second (key-expansion) step of these two-step procedures. 182
In addition to the key-derivation methods whose specifications are provided in this 183 document, [SP 800-135] describes several variants (of both the one-step and two-step 184 methods) that are approved for specific applications. 185 186 3
Definitions, Symbols and Abbreviations 187
Definitions

188
Approved
FIPS approved or NIST Recommended. An algorithm or technique that is either 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation, 2) adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation or 3) specified in a list of NIST-approved security functions.
Big-endian
The property of a byte string having its bytes positioned in order of decreasing significance. In particular, the leftmost (first) byte is the most significant (containing the most significant eight bits of the corresponding bit string) and the rightmost (last) byte is the least significant (containing the least significant eight bits of the corresponding bit string).
For the purposes of this Recommendation, it is assumed that the bits within each byte of a big-endian byte string are also positioned in order of decreasing significance (beginning with the most significant bit in the leftmost position and ending with the least significant bit in the rightmost position).
Bit length
The number of bits in a bit string. E.g., the bit length of the string 0110010101000011 is sixteen bits. The bit length of the empty (i.e., null) string is zero.
Bit string An ordered sequence of bits (represented as 0's and 1's). Unless otherwise stated in this document, bit strings are depicted as beginning with their most significant bit (shown in the leftmost position) and ending with their least significant bit (shown in the rightmost position). E.g., the most significant (leftmost) bit of 0101 is 0, and its least significant (rightmost) bit is 1. If interpreted as the 4-bit binary representation of an unsigned integer, 0101 corresponds to five.
Byte A bit string consisting of eight bits.
Byte length
The number of consecutive (non-overlapping) bytes in a byte string. For example, 0110010101000011 = 01100101 || 01000011 is two bytes long. The byte length of the empty string is zero.
Byte string An ordered sequence of bytes, beginning with the most significant (leftmost) byte and ending with the least significant (rightmost) byte. Any bit string whose bit length is a multiple of eight can be viewed as the concatenation of an ordered sequence of bytes, i.e., a byte string. E.g., the bit string 0110010101000011 can be viewed as a byte string, since it is the concatenation of two bytes: 01100101 followed by 01000011.
Estimated maximum security strength
An estimate of the largest security strength that can be attained by a cryptographic mechanism, given the explicit and implicit assumptions that are made regarding its implementation and supporting infrastructure (e.g., the algorithms employed, the selection of associated primitives and/or auxiliary functions, the choices for various parameters, the methods of generation and/or protection for any required keys, etc.). The estimated maximum security strengths of various approved cryptographic mechanisms are provided in [SP 800-57].
Concatenation
As used in this Recommendation, the concatenation, X || Y, of bit string X followed by bit string Y is the ordered sequence of bits formed by appending Y to X in such a way that the leftmost (i.e., initial) bit of Y follows the rightmost (i.e., final) bit of X.
Hash function A function that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed-length bit string. Approved hash functions are designed to satisfy the following properties:
1. (One-way) It is computationally infeasible to find any input that maps to any pre-specified output, and 2. (Collision resistant) It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.
Key expansion
The second step in the key-derivation procedure specified in this Recommendation, in which a key-derivation key is used to derive keying material having the desired length.
Keying material As used in this Recommendation, a bit string output by a keyderivation method, that can be parsed into non-overlapping segments of appropriate bit lengths to provide the cryptographic keys and/or any other secret parameters required by the relying application.
Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm
A family of cryptographic functions that is parameterized by a symmetric key. Each of the functions can act on input data (called a "message") of variable length to produce an output value of a specified length. The output value is called the MAC of the input message. MAC(k, x, …) is used to denote the MAC of message x computed using the key k (and any additional algorithm-specific parameters). An approved MAC algorithm is expected to satisfy the following property (for each supported security strength):
Without knowledge of the key k, it must be computationally infeasible to predict the (as-yet-unseen) value of MAC(k, x, …) with a probability of success that is a significant improvement over simply guessing either the MAC value or k, even if one has already seen the results of using that same key to compute MAC(k, xj, …) for (a bounded number of) other messages xj ≠ x.
A MAC algorithm can be employed to provide authentication of the origin of data and/or to provide data-integrity protection. In this Recommendation, approved MAC algorithms are used to determine families of pseudorandom functions (indexed by the choice of key) that may be employed during key derivation; the use of MAC algorithms for key confirmation is addressed in [SP 800-56A] and [SP 800-56B].
Nonce A varying value that has at most a negligible chance of repeatingfor example, a random value that is generated anew for each use, a timestamp, a sequence number, or some combination of these.
Pseudorandom function family (PRF)
An indexed family of (efficiently computable) functions, each defined for the same particular pair of input and output spaces. The indexed functions are pseudorandom in the following sense:
If a function from the family is selected by choosing an index value uniformly at random, and one's knowledge of the selected function is limited to the output values corresponding to a feasible number of (adaptively) chosen input values, then the selected function is computationally indistinguishable from a function chosen uniformly at random from the set of all possible functions mapping the input space to the output space.
Randomness extraction
The first step in the two-step key-derivation procedure specified in this Recommendation; during this step, a key-derivation key is produced from a shared secret.
Salt
As used in this Recommendation, a byte string (which may be secret or non-secret) that is used as a MAC key by either 1) a MACbased auxiliary function H employed in one-step key derivation, or, 2) a MAC employed in the randomness-extraction step during twostep key derivation.
Security strength A number characterizing the amount of work that is expected to suffice to "defeat" an implemented cryptographic mechanism (e.g., by compromising its functionality and/or circumventing the protection that its use was intended to facilitate). In this Recommendation, security strength is measured in bits. If the security strength of a particular implementation of a cryptographic mechanism is s bits, it is expected that the equivalent of (roughly) 2 s basic operations of some sort will be sufficient to defeat it in some way.
Shared secret
The secret byte string that is computed/generated during the execution of an approved key-establishment scheme and used as input to a key-derivation method as part of that transaction.
Shall
A requirement that needs to be fulfilled to claim conformance to this Recommendation. Note that shall may be coupled with not to become shall not.
Support (a security strength)
A security strength of s bits is said to be supported by a particular choice of algorithm, primitive, auxiliary function, parameters (etc.) for use in the implementation of a cryptographic mechanism if that choice will not prevent the resulting implementation from attaining a security strength of at least s bits.
In this Recommendation, it is assumed that implementation choices are intended to support a security strength of 112 bits or more (see and [SP 800-131A]).
Targeted security strength
The maximum security strength that is intended to be supported by one or more implementation-related choices (such as algorithms, primitives, auxiliary functions, parameter sizes and/or actual parameters) for the purpose of implementing a cryptographic mechanism.
Symbols and Abbreviations
0x
A marker used to indicate that the following symbols are to be interpreted as a bit string written in hexadecimal notation (using the symbols 0, 1, …, 9, and A, B, …, F to denote 4-bit binary representations of the integers zero through nine and ten through fifteen, respectively). A byte can be represented by a hexadecimal string of length two; the leftmost hexadecimal symbol corresponds to the most significant four bits of the byte, and the rightmost hexadecimal symbol corresponds to the least significant four bits of the byte. For example, 0x9D represents the bit string 10011101 (assuming that the bits are positioned in order of decreasing significance). its output is a 128-bit MAC computed over the "message" x using the key k.
counter An unsigned integer, represented as a big-endian four-byte string, that is employed by the one-step key-derivation method specified in Section 4.1.
Context
A bit string of context-specific data; a subcomponent of the FixedInfo that is included as part of the input to the two-step key-derivation method specified in Section 5.1.
default_salt
A default value assigned to salt (if necessary) to implement an auxiliary function H selected according to Option 2 or 3 in the one-step key-derivation method specified in Section 4.1.
DerivedKeyingMaterial Keying material that is derived from a shared secret Z (and other data) through the use of a key-derivation method.
ECC Elliptic curve cryptography.
enc8(x)
A one-byte encoding of an integer x, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 255, with bit 0 being the low-order (least significant) bit and bit 7 being the high-order (most significant) bit.
FFC Finite field cryptography.
FixedInfo A bit string of context-specific data whose value does not change during the execution of a key-derivation method specified in this Recommendation.
H
The auxiliary function used to produce blocks of keying material during the execution of the one-step key-derivation method specified in Section 4.1. 
HMAC-hash(k, x)
An implementation of HMAC using the hash function hash; its output is a MAC computed over "message" x using the key k.
H_outputlen
A positive integer that indicates the length (in bits) of the output of either 1) the auxiliary function H used in the onestep key-derivation method specified in Section 4.1, or, 2) an auxiliary HMAC algorithm used in the two-step keyderivation method specified in Section 5.1.
IFC
Integer factorization cryptography. 
IV
KMAC#(k, x, l, S)
A variant of KMAC (either KMAC128 or KMAC256, as specified in [SP 800-185]); its output is an l-bit MAC computed over the "message" x using the key k and "customization string" S.
L
A positive integer specifying the desired length (in bits) of the derived keying material.
[L]2 An agreed-upon encoding of the integer L as a bit string.
MAC Message Authentication Code.
An instance of a MAC algorithm computed over the "message" x using the key k (and any additional algorithmspecific parameters).
max_H_inputlen
The maximum length (in bits) for strings used as input to the auxiliary function H employed by the one-step keyderivation method specified in Section 4.1.
OtherInput
A collective term for any and all additional data (other than the shared secret itself) used as input to a key-derivation method specified in this Recommendation. 
PRF
is identical to (k, x). 216
This property is consistent with the use of the MAC algorithm as the specification of a 217 family of pseudorandom functions defined on the appropriate message space and indexed 218 by the choice of MAC key. Under Option 2 and Option 3 of the KDF specification below, 219 the auxiliary function H is a particular selection from such a family. 220
Specification of Key-Derivation Functions
221
A family of one-step key-derivation functions is specified as follows: 222 This section specifies an approved (two-step) extraction-then-expansion key-derivation 400 procedure. Like the one-step key-derivation functions described in Section 4, the input to 401 this two-step procedure includes Z, the shared secret generated during the execution of a 402 key-establishment scheme that is specified in either [SP 800-56A] or [SP 800-56B]); L, a 403 positive integer indicating the desired length (in bits) of the output keying material; and 404 other information (as determined by the particular implementation of the key-establishment 405 scheme and/or key-derivation method). In contrast to the one-step methods, a salt value is 406 required to be included as part of the input. 407
Function call: KDM( Z, OtherInput
The extraction-then-expansion key-derivation procedure is pictured in Figure 1 . The first (randomness-extraction) step uses either HMAC, as defined in [FIPS 198 ], or 414 AES-CMAC, as defined in [SP 800-38B]. In either case, there are two inputs: salt, which 415 serves as a MAC key, and the shared secret, Z, which serves as the "message." The resulting 416 MAC output is used as a key-derivation key, KDK. The use of this KDK is restricted to a 417 single execution of the key-expansion step of this procedure. 418
The second (key-expansion) step uses the key-derivation key, KDK, along with the integer 419 L and other appropriate data, as the input to a PRF-based key-derivation function specified 420 in [SP 800-108]. The output returned by that key-derivation function is either secret keying 421 material (in the form of DerivedKeyingMaterial, a bit string of length L) or an error 422
indicator. 423
Specification of Key-Derivation Procedure
424
The extraction-then-expansion key-derivation procedure is specified as follows: 425 One of the general-purpose PRF-based key-derivation functions defined in [SP 800-437 108] shall be used for key expansion. These key-derivation functions employ an 438 approved MAC algorithm as the PRF. In this Recommendation, the PRF used in key 439 expansion is determined by the MAC algorithm that is used for randomness extraction. 440
Specifically: 441 a. If HMAC-hash is used in the randomness-extraction step, then the same HMAC-442 hash (with the same hash function hash) shall be used as the PRF in the key-443 expansion step; and 444 b. If either AES-128-CMAC, AES-192-CMAC, or AES-256-CMAC is used in the 445 randomness-extraction step, then only AES-128-CMAC (i.e., the CMAC mode of 446 AES-128) shall be used as the PRF in the key-expansion step. 447
The rationale for these rules is discussed in Section 8.3. 448
Input: 450 1. Z -a byte string that represents the shared secret. It is used as the "message" during the 451 execution of the MAC algorithm employed in the randomness-extraction step. 452 2. OtherInput, which includes: 453 a. salt -a (secret or non-secret) byte string used as the MAC key during the execution 454 of the randomness-extraction step (i.e., step 1 in the process shown below Tables 4 and 5 enumerate the possibilities for the auxiliary MAC algorithm used for  533 randomness extraction and provide additional information concerning the lengths of the 534 MAC key (i.e., the salt value) and the extracted key-derivation key (i.e., KDK). The tables 535 also indicate the range of security strengths that can be supported by each choice for MAC 536 (when used as specified in Section 5.1). 537 539 * A shorter salt (which is used as an HMAC key) will be padded, by appending an all-zero 540 bit string, to obtain a string of the indicated length (the length of a single input block for 541 hash); a longer salt will be hashed to produce a shorter string, which will then be padded 542
(by appending an all-zero bit string) to obtain a string of the indicated length. (See [FIPS  543 198] for additional information.) 544
Note:
The hash used by the HMAC algorithm employed during randomness extraction 545 shall be used again in the subsequent key-expansion step to implement the HMAC 546 algorithm that is employed as a PRF by the auxiliary PRF-based KDF. 547 approved and shall also meet the selection requirements specified in this Recommendation 559 (i.e., SP 800-56C). 560
Selecting Hash Functions and MAC Algorithms 561
The key-derivation methods specified in this Recommendation, as well as those 562 enumerated in [SP 800-135], use hash functions and/or message authentication code 563 (MAC) algorithms as auxiliary functions. In particular: 564
• The one-step key-derivation functions that are specified in Section 4.1 of this 565
Recommendation employ an appropriate choice of hash function (hash), an HMAC 566 algorithm based on an appropriate choice of hash function (HMAC-hash), or one 567 of two KMAC variants (KMAC128 or KMAC256) to implement the auxiliary 568 function H. 569
• The extraction-then-expansion key-derivation procedure specified in Section 5.1 570 employs either an HMAC algorithm based on an appropriate choice of hash 571 function (HMAC-hash) for both randomness extraction and key expansion, or an 572 appropriate variant of the AES-CMAC algorithm (i.e., AES-N-CMAC for N = 128, 573 192, or 256) for randomness extraction together with AES-128-CMAC for key 574 expansion. 575
Unless explicitly stated to the contrary, (e.g., in [SP 800-135]), the following requirements 576 apply to the hash functions and MAC algorithms employed for key derivation: 577
• Whenever a hash function is employed (including as the primitive used by HMAC), 578 an approved hash function shall be used. [FIPS 180] and [FIPS 202 ] specify 579 approved hash functions. 580
• Whenever an HMAC algorithm is employed, the HMAC implementation shall 581 conform to the specifications found in [FIPS 198] . 582
• Whenever a KMAC variant (KMAC128 or KMAC256) is employed, the KMAC 583 implementation shall conform to the specifications found in [SP 800-185]. 584
• Whenever an AES-CMAC algorithm is employed, the implementation of AES shall 585 conform to [FIPS 197 ] and the AES-CMAC implementation shall conform to [SP 586 800-38B]. 587
As specified in [SP 800-56A] and [SP 800-56B], an approved key-establishment scheme 588 can be implemented with parameters of various types and sizes that will impact the 589 estimated maximum security strength that can be supported by the resulting scheme. When 590 a key-establishment scheme employs a choice of parameters that are associated with a 591 targeted security strength of s bits, the selection of a hash function, HMAC, KMAC, or 592 AES-CMAC employed during the implementation of its key-derivation method shall 593 conform to the following restrictions: 594
• An approved hash function shall be employed (whether alone or as the primitive 595 used by HMAC) in the implementation of a one-step or two-step key-derivation 596 method only if its output block length (in bits) is greater than or equal to s. 597
• For the purposes of implementing one-step key derivation only: KMAC128 shall be 598 employed only in instances where s is 128 bits or less; KMAC256 shall be employed 599 only in instances where s is 256 bits or less. (See, however, the note below.) 600
• For the purposes of implementing two-step key derivation only: AES-CMAC shall 601 be employed only in instances where s is 128 bits or less. (See the note following 602 In this section, the following issues are discussed: 613
